

# DAIMON AS A FORCE SHAPING *ETHOS* IN HERACLITUS

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IN FRAGMENT B119 Heraclitus makes the succinct statement: *ἄνθρωπος δαίμων*.<sup>1</sup> This occupies a position of central importance among the fragments of Heraclitus since it hints at what he conceived the relationship of the human *ethos* and the Divine to be. The fragment shows how man can perceive the Divine and to what extent he can do so.

Fragment B119 has most frequently been interpreted as an assertion that man is responsible for his own destiny (= *daimon*).<sup>2</sup> Heraclitus is thought to be stating that man is free from the influence of a *daimon* which could determine his fate and is capable by his own character, by his *ethos*, of establishing the course that his life will take. An opposite

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<sup>2</sup>See H. Gomperz, "Über die ursprüngliche Reihenfolge einiger Bruchstücke Heraklits," *Hermes* 58 (1923) 42-44; Thimme 48; Gigon 110; F. J. Brecht, *Heraklit* (Heidelberg 1936) 84-85; P. Schmitt, "Geist und Seele," *Eranos-Jb* 13 (1945) 167; M. Pohlenz, *Der hellenische Mensch* (Göttingen 1947) 29, 65; Dodds 42, 182; François 342; Kirk and Raven 214; A. Jeannière, *La Pensée d'Héraclite d'Éphèse* (Paris 1959) 83, 113; H. Quiring, *Heraklit* (Berlin 1959) 113; P. Wheelwright, *Heraclitus* (Princeton 1959) 68; A. Lesky, "Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos," *SBHeidelb* 1961.4, 46-47; H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich 1962) 447; Guthrie 1.482; C. H. Kahn, "A New Look at Heraclitus," *AmPhilQuar* 1 (1964) 200; Marcovich 502; and M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford 1971) 154. H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 84, suggests that Heraclitus makes no innovation in saying that "character is for man a daimon,—that is, a god or the dispenser of his fate," but is echoing traditional ideas concerning the activity of the *daimon* that are already found in Homer. Lloyd-Jones does not, however, discuss the relationship of *ethos* and *daimon*.

view denies that this fragment declares man can determine his own destiny and asserts that the fragment says rather that human initiative and divine rule are two aspects of the same thing (Verdenius 29–30). Man can listen to the Divine (= *Logos*) and follow it because the Divine (= *daimon*) manifests itself in his *ethos*. Neither view, I think, expresses the full implications of the fragment when viewed in context of the remaining fragments of Heraclitus and of the use of *daimon* and *ethos* by other writers of the Archaic Age of Greece.

The present article argues that Heraclitus' choice of the term *daimon* was a precise one and that B119 states that the *daimon* helps to shape man's *ethos*, not that his *ethos* is equivalent to his *daimon*. On the one hand, man cannot act without the *daimon* and is not therefore entirely free. On the other hand, man is not merely a passive beneficiary of the *daimon*'s activity. A middle view seems more appropriate to Heraclitus' thought: i.e., man and *daimon* together act to shape man's *ethos*.

### *Ethos in Writers Earlier Than Heraclitus*

The way in which *ethos* and *daimon* were employed by writers earlier than Heraclitus sheds light on the meaning of the terms in fragment B119.<sup>3</sup> In the three passages of Homer where *ethos* occurs, it appears only in the plural and means the "accustomed haunts" of animals (*Il.* 6.511, 15.268; *Od.* 14.411). Hesiod likewise uses *ethea* to signify the "accustomed abodes" of men (*Works and Days* 167–168, 222, 524–525; fr. 204.103 Merkelbach-West). *Ethea*, however, also has for Hesiod an extended meaning and denotes the "customary habits" of men or gods, habits that are not inborn but can be learned (*Works and Days* 135–137, 699; *Theogony* 66–67). In two passages of Hesiod *ethos* appears in the singular to describe the "disposition" common to all women, namely an ἐπικλοπον ἦθος (*Works and Days* 67, 78). The several traits that characterize women's behaviour can now be described by this one expression.

*Ethos* does not occur frequently in the lyric poets.<sup>4</sup> Solon speaks of the αἰκία . . . ἥθη δεσποτῶν (24.13–14 D = 36 West); ἥθη refers to the ways in which δεσπότες are accustomed to act. In the Danaë fragment Simonides speaks of a child sleeping in a γαλαθηνῶ ἥθει (543.8–9 PMG); here again the word *ethos* simply means a way of behaviour, in this case one suitable to a young baby.

Theognis provides a larger scope of meaning for *ethos*. In lines 1261–

<sup>3</sup>For *ethos* see E. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque*<sup>3</sup> (Paris 1938) 218; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* 1 (Heidelberg 1960) 449, 625; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque* 2 (Paris 1968) 407–408; Thimme; and J. Schmidt, *Ethos* (Diss., Leipzig 1941).

<sup>4</sup>Instances are found only in Solon, Simonides, Theognis, and Pindar. These passages are discussed below. In Anacreon 402a.1–2 (PMG) the reading is disputed.

1262 he speaks of a person having the *σχέτλιον ἦθος* of an *ικτίνος ἀγχίστροφος* (cf. 1301–1302); in lines 1243–1244 he mentions a *δόλιον ἦθος*. In both cases *ethos* refers to a specific disposition whose nature is revealed by the adjective that modifies it. In lines 963–970 Theognis reveals elements that affect the *ethos*:

μήποτ' ἐπαινήσης, πρὶν ἂν εἰδῇς ἄνδρα σαφηνῶς,  
 ὀργὴν καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ τρόπον ὅστις ἂν ᾖ.  
 πολλοὶ τοι κίβδηλον ἐπὶ κλοπῶν ἦθος ἔχοντες  
 κρύπτουσ' ἐνθήμενοι θυμὸν ἐφημέριον.  
 τούτων δ' ἐκφαίνει πάντων χρόνος ἦθος ἐκάστων.  
 καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ γνώμης πολλὸν ἄρ' ἐκτὸς ἔβην  
 ἔβην αἰνήσας πρὶν σοῦ κατὰ πάντα δαῖναι  
 ἦθεα· νῦν δ' ἤδη νηὺς ἄθ' ἐκὰς διέχω.

Ὀργή, ῥυθμός, and τρόπος influence a person's *ethea*, his particular habits, as well as his disposition as a whole, his *ethos*.<sup>5</sup> In these lines the *thymos* exhibits qualities that "last only for a day" whereas the *ethos* seems more permanent in nature. In the following lines a flexible ὀργή gives evidence of an *ethos* that is ποικίλον:

θυμέ, φίλους κατὰ πάντας ἐπίστρεφε ποικίλον ἦθος,  
 ὀργὴν συμμίσγων ἦντιν' ἕκαστος ἔχει . . . . (213–214)

<sup>5</sup> Ὀργή is not found in Homer. Hesiod mentions the ὀργή of drones (*Works and Days* 304); here ὀργή signifies the "temper" or "disposition" of the drones. This meaning of ὀργή occurs frequently in the lyric poets; see Semonides 7.42(D); Tyrtaeus 8.8 (D = West); Sappho 120.2 (LP); Theognis 98, 214–215, 312, 1059, 1072–1073, 1164b, 1258; Pindar *Pyth.* 1.89, 2.77, 4.141, 9.43, *Nem.* 5.32, *Isth.* 1.41, 2.35, 5.34, 6.14, fr. 70b20 (Snell) and Bacchylides fr. 34.1 (Snell-Maehler). Only in *HCer* 205, Sappho 158.1(LP), and Theognis 1223 does ὀργή signify "anger." In Alcaeus 304 (LP) and Sappho 103.7 (LP) the context is not clear. In line 964 of Theognis the word signifies the "temper" of a person. Cf. van Groningen 83.

Ῥυσμός occurs first in Archilochus 67 A.7 (D = 128 West) where the word signifies the pattern of change in human affairs. Cf. Democritus B266 where ῥυθμός indicates the "pattern" of the atoms. In Anacreon 416.2 (*PMG*), *Carmina* 851b2 (*PMG*) and *Adesp.* 967 (*PMG*) ῥυθμός signifies the "pattern" or "rhythm" of movement in poetry. In Pindar fr. 52i(b)5 (Snell) ῥυθμός signifies "symmetry." In line 964 of Theognis, it means the "pattern" of character traits that the individual may reveal. See W. Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. G. Highet, 1 (Oxford 1945) 125–126; E. Benveniste, "La Notion de 'Rythme' dans son Expression linguistique," *JPsychNormPath* 44 (1951) 401–410; R. Renhan, "The Derivation of ῥυθμός," *CP* 58 (1963) 36–38, and D. E. Gerber, *Euterpe* (Amsterdam 1970) 30.

Τρόπος is not found in Homer or Hesiod. In some passages in the lyric poets it can mean "method" or "way": Semonides 7.78 (D = West), Pindar *Ol.* 8.63, *Nem.* 7.14, *Isth.* 6.58, and fr. 7 (Snell). In other passages it can signify a musical style: Pindar *Ol.* 3.4, 10.77, 14.17, *Pyth.* 10.38, fr. 52b102 (Snell) and fr. 107b2 (Snell). Occasionally it means "character" or "disposition": Pindar *Nem.* 1.29 (cf. Epicharmus B17). This latter meaning of τρόπος appears in line 964 of Theognis.

By modifying his *δργή* to suit the individual whom he encounters, a man will exhibit the results of a *ποικίλον ἦθος*; this man's disposition will be such that it will adapt itself to suit any situation.

If the reading *θυμέ* is correct in line 213,<sup>6</sup> *thumos* emerges both as a location where a changing *δργή* is found and as a part of man that can express a particular *ethos*. In line 966, however, the *ethos* failed to be expressed by its *thumos*: many have an *ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος* but they conceal this by exhibiting a *thumos* that "lasts only for a day." *Thumos* can be a part of man through which his *ethos* is expressed (213), or it can be a part of a man capable of concealing the *ethos*. In lines 1301–1302 *thumos* and *ethos* again appear to be related:

... σὺ δὲ μάργον ἔχων καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν  
φεύγεις, ἱκτίνου σχέτλιον ἦθος ἔχων.

Both the *thumos* and the *ethos* are marked by negative qualities. In Theognis the *ethos* is clearly related to some factors that were thought to compose the human personality (*δργή*, *τρόπος*, *ῥυθμός*, and *θυμός*) but the relationship is not sharply defined.

In Pindar *ethos* occurs in only four passages. In *Pythians* 4.258 it appears in the plural with the meaning of "abode" or "dwelling place." But in *Olympians* 11.19–20 Pindar says that neither the fox nor the lion can change its *ἐμφυὲς ἦθος*; in *Olympians* 13.13 he says that it is difficult to conceal one's *συγγενὲς ἦθος*. In these expressions *ethos* indicates a disposition that is innate. Pindar, with his strong emphasis on the importance of *φύα*,<sup>7</sup> clearly believed that a person's accustomed way of acting which results from his *ethos* was dependent on the nature that he inherited at birth. It is significant also (with reference to B119 of Heraclitus) that the *φύα* itself was apparently influenced by the *δαίμων γενέθλιος* that attended a man from birth (*Ol.* 13.104–105). In Pindar it is the *φύα* (itself in some way dependent upon the *daimon*) that determines the *ethos*. Finally, in *Nemeans* 8.35–36 Pindar prays that he will be saved from having a deceitful *ethos* and that he will walk instead in the "simple paths of life." This prayer suggests that a man's *ethos* could change and become evil and that Zeus could protect the *ethos* from taking on undesirable characteristics. Again the influence that the gods have in moulding the *ethos* is suggested.

It is in the fragments of Heraclitus that *ethos* first occurs among the Presocratics. After Heraclitus it is found among them only in Empedocles and Democritus.<sup>8</sup> In his use of *ethos* Empedocles makes explicit the two

<sup>6</sup>The variant reading *Κύρνε* (O, all *dett.*) appears in line 1071. Except for this word lines 1071–1072 are identical to lines 213–214. Cf. van Groningen 82.

<sup>7</sup>See for example *Ol.* 9.100, *Pyth.* 8.44, *Nem.* 3.40–42, and *Ol.* 2.10–11.

<sup>8</sup>Empedocles B17, B28, B110.4–5; Democritus B57, B192.

features of *ethos* that were less clearly articulated in Hesiod and the lyric poets. First of all, in fragment B17 Empedocles says that of the four elements and Love and Strife each has an *ethos* peculiar to itself. For Empedocles this *ethos* clearly corresponds to the physical nature of the four elements and to the type of movement that the two motive powers cause. For Hesiod and the lyric poets the *ethos* (whether ἐπίκλοπον, γαλαθηνόν, δόλιον, or ποικίλον<sup>9</sup>) signifies a particular disposition revealed in one's outward behaviour. In fragment B110 Empedocles appears to say<sup>10</sup> that if Pausanias guards the teachings he has been given, each of these teachings will grow into an *ethos*, an "accustomed place" within him, according to its nature. Here again we have the notion of *ethos* as an entity of a particular type and also the notion (which appeared in Hesiod, Theognis, and Pindar) that the *ethos* is something that can grow and change.

### *Daimon in Writers Earlier Than Heraclitus*

*Daimon* is probably derived from the root *dai-*, "to apportion."<sup>11</sup> The term occurs frequently in the writers earlier than Heraclitus.<sup>12</sup> In Homer it is not possible to draw fine distinctions between *daimon* and *theos* but *daimon* seems to indicate a being whose characteristics are less clearly apprehended by men than those of a *theos*.<sup>13</sup> *Daimon* is often used when the speaker attributes some action to a divine power whose actual identity he does not know. Thus, for example, Menelaus says that Helen was moved by some *daimon* who wished to give glory to the Trojans when she came out to the Wooden Horse (*Od.* 4.275); Menelaus realized that

<sup>9</sup>Hesiod *Works and Days* 67, Theognis 965; Simonides 543.8–9 (*PMG*); Theognis 1244; Theognis 213, 1071.

<sup>10</sup>It is not clear what ταῦτα refers to in line 3 of B110.

<sup>11</sup>Boisacq 162; Frisk 1.340–341; and Chantraine 1.246–247 (above, note 3).

<sup>12</sup>For *daimon* see S. E. Bassett, "ΔΑΙΜΩΝ in Homer," *CR* 33 (1919) 134–136; W. Porzig, "ΔΑΙΜΩΝ," *Indogermanische Forschungen* 41 (1923) 169–174; Wilamowitz 1. 356–364; M. Untersteiner, "Il Concetto di ΔΑΙΜΩΝ in Omero," *Atene e Roma* 7 (1939) 93–134; G. Patroni, "La Voce ΔΑΙΜΩΝ in Omero," *RAI* 1 (1940) 99–104; P. C. van der Horst, "ΔΑΙΜΩΝ," *Mnemosyne* 10 (1941) 61–68; P. Chantraine, "Le Divin et les Dieux chez Homère," *La Notion du Divin depuis Homère jusqu' à Platon* (Geneva 1954, Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens* 1) 51–54; Brunius-Nilsson 115–154; François; M. Detienne, "La 'Démonologie' d'Empédocle," *REG* 72 (1959) 1–17; Gerber; M. Detienne, *La Notion de Daimôn dans le Pythagorisme* (Paris 1963) 93–120; M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*<sup>3</sup> 1 (Munich 1967) 216–222; and Chantraine (above, note 3) 1.246–256.

<sup>13</sup>Gerber 80, and B. C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London 1965) 321–322. This holds true in most cases but contrast *Il.* 3.420 where the *daimon* is clearly Aphrodite. So also in *Od.* 15.261 and *Il.* 19.188 *daimon* appears to refer to a definite Olympian deity. In *HCer* 300 the *daimon* is Demeter; in *HMer* 138, 551 the *daimon* is Hermes.

Helen was guided by some divine power but he did not know its precise identity.<sup>14</sup> In contrast to the frequent occurrence of *daimon* in the singular, *daimon* in the plural occurs in only three instances in Homer;<sup>15</sup> this suggests that the word was usually employed to signify the working of a single, though unidentified, divine power in a specific situation. In many passages of Homer the *daimon*, like the *theos*, appears as an agent that assigns a destiny.<sup>16</sup> This connection of *daimon* with destiny becomes explicit in *Odyssey* 11.61 where mention is made of the δαίμονος αἷσα κακά (see also *HMer* 343). In most instances *daimon* is that which assigns destiny rather than the destiny assigned (cf. Gerber 85, Brunius-Nilsson 123). In *Iliad* 8.166, however, *daimon* appears to have the extended meaning of "destiny" itself; Hector says to Diomedes: πάρος τοι δαίμονα δώσω.<sup>17</sup> The arrival of one's *daimon* marks the fulfilment of one's destiny. This passage foreshadows instances in authors after Homer where *daimon* is seen to have both senses.

In Hesiod the *daimon* appears for the first time as a divine being whose powers and position are explicitly inferior to those of a *theos* (Wilamowitz 1.360–361, Gerber 84). In *Works and Days* 122, 126 the men of the Golden Age are said to become upon their death δαίμονες ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων πλουτοδόται. In *Theogony* 991 Phaethon after death is made a δαίμων ὄϊος. Man is sometimes capable after death of achieving quasi-divinity in the form of a *daimon* and in this form he is endowed with specific duties; nonetheless he does not possess the power that the gods have. Further in *Works and Days* 314 there is the expression δαίμονι δ'όϊος ἔησθα. Men apparently differ from one another in respect to their *daimon*.

As in Homer, in some passages of the lyric poets *daimon* appears clearly as a type of divinity without specific reference to any role as an agent associated with man's destiny,<sup>18</sup> but it also often appears to designate the

<sup>14</sup>See also *Il.* 7.291, 377, 396; 9.600; 11.480, 791; 15.403, 418, 466; 21.93; *Od.* 3.27; 5.396, 421; 7.248; 9.381; 10.64; 11.587; 12.169; 14.386, 488; 16.194, 370; 17.243, 446; 18.146; 19.10, 138, 201, 512; 20.87; 21.201; 24.149, 306; *HMer* 343; *H.vii* (Dionysus) 31.

Cf. the use of *daimon* in the expression δαίμονι ἵσος (*Il.* 5.438, 459; 5.884; 16.705, 786; 20.447, 493; 21.18, 227; *HCer* 235). The individual described is imbued with a strength such as a divinity—any unnamed divinity—would possess. Cf. also Brunius-Nilsson 127–134 and François 327–329.

<sup>15</sup>*Il.* 1.222, 6.115, 23.595. In these passages *daimones* are equivalent to *theoi*. Cf. also *HApoll* 11, *HCer* 338, and *HMer* 381.

<sup>16</sup>See for example *Od.* 2.134–135, 3.166, 6.172, 12.295, 16.64, 18.256, and 19.129.

<sup>17</sup>Wilamowitz 1.358–359 suggests that *daimon* in the prepositional phrase πρὸς δαίμονα (*Il.* 17.98 and 17.104) may mean the same as ὑπὲρ μόρον; here then would be two other occurrences in Homer of *daimon* with the meaning of "destiny."

<sup>18</sup>Archilochus 45 (D = 210 West); Alcman 116 (*PMG*); Solon 24.4 (D); and Theognis 381–382, 1333–1334.

spirit that guides and shapes a man's destiny. This meaning is found in lines 161–166 of Theognis:<sup>19</sup>

πολλοί τοι χρῶνται δειλαῖς φρεσί, δαίμονι δ' ἐσθλῶ,  
οἷς τὸ κακὸν δοκέον γίνεται εἰς ἀγαθόν.  
εἰσιν δ' οἷ βουλῇ τ' ἀγαθῇ καὶ δαίμονι δειλῶ  
μοχθίζουσι, τέλος δ' ἔργμασιν οὐχ ἔπεται.  
οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὔτ' ὄλβιος οὔτε πενιχρός,  
οὔτε κακὸς νόσφιν δαίμονος οὔτ' ἀγαθός.

In this passage *daimon* can signify both the power that assigns man's lot and the lot assigned.<sup>20</sup> So also in lines 349–350 Theognis prays that a *daimon* will come to his aid and bring about the fulfilment of his prayers. Again we see the partial dependence of man on the good effects of the *daimon*.

In a fragment of Alcman (65[PMG]) *daimones* are assigned, perhaps to different individuals:

† οἷθεν † πάλως ἔπαλε δαίμονάς τ' ἐδάσσατο . . .

In the expression δαίμονάς τ' ἐδάσσατο, as in πάλως ἔπαλε, the object is drawn from the same root as the verb. The expression gives evidence for the primary meaning of *daimon*: that which apportions or distributes. In Phocylides 16 D *daimones* appear as powers that influence the activities of men:

ἀλλ' ἄρα δαίμονές εἰσιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοτε ἄλλοι  
οἱ μὲν ἐπερχομένου κακοῦ ἀνέρας ἐκλύσασθαι . . .

It is significant that according to Phocylides not only do different men have different *daimones* but a man's own *daimon* can also change (as ἄλλοτε suggests).

Just as in Hesiod, *daimon* is used in the lyric poets to indicate the type of divinity that a man can attain. Theognis in lines 1347–1348 speaks of Ganymede's being made a *daimon*. This use of *daimon* to indicate an entity inferior to the *theoi* occurs also in Theognis 637–638, where *ἐλπίς* and *κίνδυνος* are described as *χαλεποὶ δαίμονες*. Here again *daimon* is employed to designate forces in the lives of men. In this passage "hope" and "fear" have a power of their own at work in man (Dodds 41, van Groningen 253–254, 455). They can possess a man and cause his actions. These two would not be called *theoi* but could be termed *daimones*, i.e., entities with

<sup>19</sup>Note also the role of *daimon* in Theognis 149–150, 402–404.

<sup>20</sup>In Anacreon 347.11–14 (PMG) it is likewise unclear whether *daimon* signifies the agent that assigns destiny or destiny itself. For *daimon* as "dispenser of fate" see also *Fragmenta Adespota* 1018b (PMG) where the three fates, Aisa, Clotho, and Lachesis, are called *daimones*.

powers peculiar to themselves, however limited these powers may be in comparison with the full divinity possessed by the gods.

In several passages of Pindar and Bacchylides *daimon*, especially in the plural, appears as a type of divinity without explicit reference made to its role as a force shaping man's destiny.<sup>21</sup> Usually, however, *daimon* is used to mean a power who assigns a man's lot (Gerber 92 ff.). In *Pythians* 8.76–78 Pindar says that the attainment of ἐσλά does not rest in man's hands but depends on the nature of his *daimon*.<sup>22</sup> In *Olympians* 9.27–28 he says that men are "good and wise in accordance with their *daimon*." In *Pythians* 10.10 he says that the "beginning and the end are sweet for men if their *daimon* hasten their growth."<sup>23</sup> Each person has his own *daimon* which differs from person to person: θνήσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες· δαίμων δ' αἴσιος.<sup>24</sup> A δαίμων γενέθλιος attends a man, strongly influencing what his life will be.<sup>25</sup> A man's φνῆ, inherited from his ancestors, enables him to achieve *arete* but it is the *daimon genethlios* that activates the better elements in his φνῆ and promotes the final attainment of his *arete*.

In the following passages *daimon* designates both the agency that influences destiny and destiny itself:

Ζεῦ πάτερ,  
καὶ τόνδε λαὸν ἀβλαβῇ νέμων  
Ξενοφῶντος εἵθυε δαίμονος οὔρου' (Ol. 13.26–28)

Δίος τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνή  
δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων (Pyth. 5.122–123)

The two passages show that the *daimon* is a spirit closely connected with the individual whereas Zeus is a more remote divine being who possesses far more comprehensive power. How intimately connected with man's personal being the *daimon* has come to be is shown in *Pythians* 3 where Pindar speaks of the *daimon* as surrounding his *phrenes*:

τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντ' αἰεὶ φρασίν  
δαίμον' ἀσκήσω κατ' ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μηχανάν (Pyth. 3.108–109)

In Pindar man is still subject to an agency outside himself but one now more clearly associated with himself.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup>See Ol. 7.39, Pyth. 4.28; Bacch. 3.37–39 (*daimon* in the singular); and Ol. 1.35, 6.45–47, Pyth. 1.12, 3.59, Nem. 9.45, Isth. 4.19–21, 8.23–24; Bacch. 9.82–84 and 17.117–118 (*daimon* in the plural).

<sup>22</sup>Cf. Bacch. 9.25–26, 14.1–2, 17.46, frs. 13 and 25.1–3 (Snell-Maehler).

<sup>23</sup>Cf. as well Pyth. 12.28–32, Nem. 5.15–16, and Isth. 6.10–13.

<sup>24</sup>Isth. 7.42–43. See also Isth. 5.11, Pyth. 3.34–36, and Bacch. 16.23–29.

<sup>25</sup>Ol. 13.105. Cf. Bacch. 5.113–116 and 129–135.

<sup>26</sup>In the lyric poets *daimon* occurs also in Alcman 1.23 (PMG); Alcaeus 200.4, 119.4 (LP); Inc. Lesb. 3 (LP); and Pindar fr. 311 (Snell), though the context is not clear.



In the fragments of the Presocratics *daimon* is found first in Heraclitus. Parmenides uses *daimon* to denote the power that guides the world of *Doxa* (B12.3). The sharp distinction that Parmenides draws between the world of Being and the world of Seeming (*Doxa*) probably determines his choice of *daimon* for this function. In the world of Seeming there can be place only for a power inferior to the full divinity, i.e., to Being itself. Further, in Parmenides' description of his journey to the realm of Light (B1), it is on the road of the *daimon* that he travels.<sup>27</sup> Parmenides' use of *daimon* suggests that, although man in the world of *Doxa* attains only this incomplete perception of the Divine, his perception does provide a path by which he can come to know the Divine in its true nature.

In the thought of Empedocles,<sup>28</sup> *daimon* must suffer punishment by exile from the "blessed ones" because it has "put its trust in Strife" (B115.15). The *daimones* undergo different incarnations (B117) until, in the final stages of purification, they emerge as *μάντεις*, *ὑμνοπόλοι*, *ἱητροί*, and *πρόμοι* (B146). After thirty thousand *ᾠραι* (B115), the *daimones* become once again, upon death, *ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι* (B147). The *daimon* lives within man as it undergoes its purifications. For Empedocles a man's *daimon* is an active force working within him to shape his life.<sup>29</sup> Because it was a being with lesser powers than those of the *theoi*, Empedocles could appropriately employ *daimon* to designate a "fallen divinity."

### *Heraclitus*

Because of the way *ethos* and *daimon* were used in writers before Heraclitus, I offer the following interpretation of his B119, *ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων*.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup>B1.3. I have accepted the reading *δαίμονος*; see Guthrie 2.7.

<sup>28</sup>The word occurs in B59.1 and B115.5.

<sup>29</sup>Cf. Plato's description of a *daimon* as the spirit that guides man through life: *ὁ ἕκαστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει* (*Phaedo* 107d). By contrast, in *Republic* 617d-e, 620d-e the soul chooses its own *daimon*.

<sup>30</sup>An echo of B119 is found in fragment B17 of Epicharmus:

*ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποισι δαίμων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός.*

In this passage *daimon* is clearly the predicate. Gomperz (above, note 2) 43 suggests that the fragment of Epicharmus is a "scherzhafte Umbiegung" of Heraclitus' thought. Verdenius 29 suggests that Epicharmus did not understand Heraclitus. If the fragment is authentic, Epicharmus appears to be making the witty observation that a man's character can be a source of good fortune to him . . . or bad fortune. For the problem of the fragments of Epicharmus see G. Kaibel, "Epicharmos," *RE* 6 (1909) 34-41; A. Pickard-Cambridge and T. B. L. Webster, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1962) 230-290; and L. Berk, *Epicharmus* (Diss., Gronigen 1964).

With B119 of Heraclitus we can compare also the following: Democritus, fragment B171: *εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος*. Euripides, fragment 1018 (Nauck<sup>2</sup>): *ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός*. Menander

First, *ethos* denotes man's disposition, his customary and distinctive manner of acting. This is not static: it can change, though Pindar also indicates that Zeus has the power to preserve the *ethos* from change. The instances of *ethos* in Hesiod and the lyric poets have shown that the word signifies the basic disposition of man, modified by various forces. In Hesiod it is the gods who form the *ethos* of women; Theognis sees *δργή*, *τρόπος*, *ρυθμός*, and *θυμός* influencing the *ethos*; for Pindar man's *ethos* is largely dependent on his *φύα*, which is itself influenced by the *δαίμων γενέθλιος*. In these poets the *ethos* does not emerge as an active agent. This allows us to suppose that in B119 of Heraclitus *ethos* is the predicate: it is the product of the *daimon*'s activity.

Next I suggest that *daimon* denotes not only man's lot but also the agency that assigns it. The *daimon* is the active force at work within man helping to shape his life and revealing its nature in the *ethos* of each man. In B119 Heraclitus has internalized man's guiding spirit. The individual need no longer fear the arbitrary influence of an external *daimon*: he will find it within.

B119 reveals, therefore, that man's *ethos* reflects the activity of his *daimon*. Earlier writers had suggested that man's *ethos* was strongly influenced by the gods (Hesiod, Pindar), by birth (Pindar), or by the elements within man himself (Theognis); these factors were responsible for the individual's *ethos* and its changes. Heraclitus offers a new explanation for *ethos*: it is basically shaped by *daimon*. In B119 *daimon* is the subject, the active factor in the fragment. This reading of the fragment avoids taking it as a mere aphorism and shows that Heraclitus' remark was a full-fledged philosophical statement.

If man's *ethos* reflects the activity of his *daimon*, is he then merely its puppet? That interpretation hardly accords with the frequent exhortations of Heraclitus for men to change their outlook.<sup>31</sup> Above all he calls on men *ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, δότῃ κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων* (B41).<sup>32</sup> He believes

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*Epitrepontes* 1096–1098 (Sandbach): οὗτός ἐσθ' (sc. ὁ τρόπος) ἡμῖν θεός/ὅ τ' αἴτιος καὶ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ τοῦ κακῶς/πράττειν ἐκαστῷ. (Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, ed., *Menander, Das Schiedsgericht* [Berlin 1925] 112–113.) Menander, fragment 762 (Edmonds): ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκαστῷ θεός.

<sup>31</sup>See B2, B50, B73, B80, B85, B112, and B114.

<sup>32</sup>I accept the text of K. Deichgräber, "Bemerkungen zu Diogenes' Bericht über Heraklit," *Philologus* 47 (1938) 14 n.1, accepted also by G. Vlastos, "On Heraclitus," *AJP* 76 (1955) 352–354. For a discussion of the textual problem that is found in B41 consult the following: H. Gomperz, "Heraklits Einheitslehre von Alois Patin als Ausgangspunkt zum Verständnis Heraklits," *WS* 43 (1923) 117; Gigon 144; Kirk 386–391; Vlastos, *ibid.* 352–353; Kirk and Raven 204; Guthrie 1.429; Marcovich 451; Bollack and Wismann 154–155.

In writers earlier than Heraclitus *gnome* appears to be knowledge that is related to practi-

that man has the power to act but also that some force influences his actions.<sup>33</sup> For Heraclitus the force is man's *daimon*, located within. Man acts in his accustomed manner (according to his *ethos*) and his acts reflect the working of his *daimon*.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to this new explanation of man's *ethos*, B119 also reveals how and to what extent man can perceive the Divine. This will become evident if B119 is examined in relation to other fragments of Heraclitus.

*Ethos* occurs in one other fragment, B78:

ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνῶμας, θεῶν δὲ ἔχει.

This fragment is crucial for our understanding of B119. In B78 Heraclitus contrasts the ἀνθρώπειον ἦθος and the θεῶν ἦθος: the first does not have *gnomai*, but the second has. How reconcile this statement with fragment B41 where man must strive to know *gnome*?<sup>35</sup> The solution lies in Heraclitus' assertion in B119 that man's *ethos* reflects the activity of his *daimon*. Man can never have an *ethos* identical to the *theion ethos*, but he can attain

cal conduct. See Solon 16.1 (D = West), Theognis 60, 319, 396, 895, 968, 1173; Pindar *Isth.* 4.72, 6.71; and Bacch. 3.79. The *gnome* that men possess may not always be correct or good but its nature has a direct bearing on their conduct; see Theognis 128, 453, 832, 1222, Pindar *Nem.* 4.40, and Bacch. 11.35. Parmenides speaks of mistaken *gnomai* leading men to a dual view of the world (B8.53, B8.61). In Heraclitus *gnome* seems to be the "practical insight" that one gains from listening to the *Logos* (B50); with *gnome* one will act with the realization that the opposites are one. For the meaning of *gnome* see B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie, Philologische Untersuchungen* 29 (Berlin 1924) 31–37; Jaeger 233 n. 58 and *Paideia*, 452 n. 73; and S. N. Mouraviev, "Gnome," *Glotta* 51 (1973) 69–75. The meaning of *gnome* in B41 is controversial. The following scholars identify *gnome* with the Divine Principle or *Logos*: K. Deichgräber, *ibid.* 13–14; Vlastos, *ibid.* 352–353; Wheelwright (above, n.2) 104; Guthrie 1.429; and Marcovich 451–452. This view has been rejected by W. A. Heidel, "On Certain Fragments of the Presocratics," *Proc. Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences* 48 (1913) 699–702; Gigon 144; Kirk 386–389; and Kirk and Raven 204, who interpret *gnome* as the internal accusative with ἐπιστάσθαι. The only other fragment of Heraclitus in which *gnome* occurs, namely B78, says that only the divine *ethos* possesses *gnomai*. Here Heraclitus does appear to distinguish between the divine nature and the *gnome* that it possesses. The meaning of *gnome* will be discussed more fully below in the treatment of B78.

<sup>33</sup>Dodds 7, 16, 30–50, has termed this "overdetermination."

<sup>34</sup>Guthrie, 1.482, suggests further that the *daimon* of Heraclitus, like that of Empedocles, may be the immortal element in man that undergoes transmigration. Heraclitus' views about the fate of man after death are very obscure (see B25, B27, B98, B36, and B77). If Heraclitus did believe that the *daimon* migrated from person to person, this belief would lend support to the interpretation of *daimon* in B119 as an active agency working within man.

<sup>35</sup>The usual explanation given is that B78 emphasizes the enormous difference between man and god whereas B41 describes the capacity that man does have for *gnome*. See B. Snell, *Hermes* 61 (1926) 363; Thimme 48; Kirk 387, 399; and Guthrie 1.413.

a degree of *gnome* because he possesses a spark of divinity, his *daimon*. It is the *daimon* that has the potential of possessing *gnome* and its presence in man is the necessary condition of his also having *gnome*. On the one hand, fragment B78 presents the contrast between the *anthropeion* and the *theion ethos* in respect to the possession of *gnomai*.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, fragment B119 reveals that man can possess a degree of *gnome* because his *ethos* is in part a product of his *daimon*.

In this interpretation of B78 I have understood the *theion ethos* to be always beyond the reach of man, who receives its strengthening force only through the activity of his *daimon*. It would be possible to understand B78 as a contrast between a *theion ethos* in man and an *anthropeion ethos* in man,<sup>37</sup> since there are instances in the writers earlier than Heraclitus of man being called *theios*. In all such instances, however, the distinction between "man" and "god" is firmly maintained, the epithet *theios* signifying "gifted by the divine," rather than "divine in nature."

*Theios*<sup>38</sup> occurs frequently in Homer as a description of a hero, minstrel, king, or herald.<sup>39</sup> These men called *theioi* have received a special gift from the gods. The heroes and kings are sprung from the gods; the herald and the singer receive their talents from the gods.

In the lyric poets there are three examples of men called *theioi*.<sup>40</sup> In two cases the references are to heroes, namely to *θεῖος* Jason (Mimnermus 11.7 D = 11 A West) and Antilochus, a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ* (Pindar *Pyth.* 6.38). In one instance the reference is to a poet: Bacchylides calls himself a *θεῖος προφάτας* (9.3).<sup>41</sup> In all these examples gods and man occupy distinct positions. Man wins the designation *theios* because the gods have gifted him in a way that sets him apart from other men.

<sup>36</sup>The contrast between human and divine wisdom is one that occurs frequently in the early Greek writers. See for example *Il.* 2.485; Hesiod *Theogony* 27; Ibycus 1.23-27 (*PMG*); Theognis 141; Pindar *Paeon* 6.51, *Nem.* 6.1; Xenophanes B34; and Alcmaeon B1. Cf. K. Deichgräber, "Xenophanes ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ," *RhM* 87 (1938) 23-25; B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Oxford 1953) 136-152, 221; Kirk and Raven 180; and Marcovich 474.

<sup>37</sup>This is the view of J. Owens, "The Interpretation of the Heraclitean Fragments," *An Etienne Gilson Tribute* (Milwaukee 1959) 163-164.

<sup>38</sup>See L. Bieler, *ΘΕΙΟΣ ANHP* (Vienna 1935, Reprint Darmstadt 1967) 1.9-16.

<sup>39</sup>A hero: for example *Il.* 2.335, 10.243, *Od.* 1.65, 4.799, 5.198, 15.554 etc. (Odysseus); *Il.* 15.25, 20.145 (Heracles); *Il.* 19.279, 19.297 (Achilles); *Il.* 21.526 (Priam). A minstrel: for example *Od.* 1.336, 4.17, 8.43, 8.87, 8.539, 13.27, 16.252, 24.439. A king: *Od.* 4.621, 4.691, 16.335. A herald: *Il.* 4.192, 10.315.

<sup>40</sup>In Hesiod *Works and Days* 731, there is mention of a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*. L. Bieler (above, note 38) 14 suggests that *theios* in this passage was a designation for a member of a group who observed special religious practices. In what way this hypothetical group was gifted by the gods is not as clear as in the other instances where *theios* occurs.

<sup>41</sup>In Plato, Simonides is called a *σοφὸς καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ* (*Republic* 331e) and Pindar is also called *θεῖος* (*Meno* 81b).

In Heraclitus *theios* occurs in one other instance, B114:<sup>42</sup>

ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.

"Men must speak with *noos* and base their strength on what is common to all just as does a city in its law and much more firmly. For all the human laws are nurtured under the one divine law;<sup>43</sup> for it rules as far as it wishes and suffices<sup>44</sup> for all and prevails."<sup>45</sup> This fragment indicates that the human (*ἀνθρώπειος*) and the divine (*θεῖος*) were seen by Heraclitus as distinct but related states. The *theios nomos* stands apart from the *anthropeioi nomoi*, but "nurtures" them.<sup>46</sup>

B114 presents two parallel cases with an implicit relationship between the "common" and the "one divine law." Man basing his strength on the "common" and the city basing its strength on the *nomos* both respond to the presence of the Divine in its varying aspects (see schema).


<sup>42</sup>For a treatment of B114 see Gigon 13–14; Mourelatos 258–266; and Marcovich 95, who believe that there is only an analogy between the "common" and the "one divine law." Contrast F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945) 65–66; Jaeger 115; Kirk 48–56; Kirk and Raven 214; and J. Špaňár, "Heraklit Frg. 114," *Charisteria Francisco Novotny* (Prague 1962) 125, who identify the "common" and the "one divine law."

<sup>43</sup>I have understood νόμου with θεῖου. We can compare B78 where the noun ἥθος is clearly to be understood with θεῖον. Cf. Gigon 13–14; Heinimann (above, note 42) 65–66; K. von Fritz, "ΝΟΤΣ, ΝΟΕΙΝ and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras)," *CP* 40 (1945) 232; Kirk 48–56; Kirk and Raven 214; Špaňár (above, note 42) 123–127; Marcovich 91; and Bollack and Wismann 316. Contrast Brecht (above, note 2) 123, Schmitt (above, note 2) 138, 170; M. Dieckhoff, "Kolloquium über den altgriechischen Philosophen Heraklit und seine Lehre vom 30.10.1961," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift Universität-Leipzig* 11 (1962) 550–551; and Guthrie 1.425. These scholars translate ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ as "the one Divine." For further literature see Marcovich 94–95.

<sup>44</sup>ἐξαρκεῖ is not found in Homer or Hesiod. It occurs only twice in the lyric poets, both times in Pindar where it appears to mean "to be generous with" (*Ol.* 5.24, *Nem.* 1.32). The word occurs only in Heraclitus among the Presocratics. Mourelatos 261–262 suggests that ἐξαρκεῖ in B114, like ἀρκέω in Homer (e.g., *Od.* 16.261; *Il.* 6.16, 15.534) means "to protect" or "to defend." The verb may suggest the capacity of the divine law to supply all human laws and to ensure their validity. See also Kirk 48–56 and Marcovich 95.

<sup>45</sup>περιγίγνομαι is found in Homer with the meaning "to excel, be superior in" (*Il.* 23.318; *Od.* 8.102–103, 8.252–253). It is not found in Hesiod or the lyric poets. It occurs in the Presocratics once elsewhere, namely in Democritus B218 where it means "to arise from, to be left over from." If Heraclitus is using the term in the Homeric sense, he is emphasizing the superior nature of the divine law over the human laws that take their source from it. Cf. Jaeger 230 n. 42 and Mourelatos 261. Contrast Kirk 48–50; Guthrie 1.425; and Marcovich 95, 97 n. 5.

<sup>46</sup>For a discussion of the significance of τρέφονται see Kirk 53–55; Mourelatos 262–264; and Marcovich 95.



SCHEMA

It is by "speaking with *noos*" that men are able *ισχυρίσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων*. The "common" to which man will stand in a dependent relationship here is the Divine *Logos* which Heraclitus calls *ξυνός* (B2). It is man's capacity to speak *ξὺν νόῳ* that puts him into contact with the *ξυνόν*, the "common." His own *logos* leads him to the Divine *Logos* in which it shares and from which it draws strength.<sup>47</sup> Heraclitus' play on the words *ξὺν νόῳ* (*λέγοντας*) and *ξυνῷ* becomes most meaningful: speech *ξὺν νόῳ* is equivalent to participation in the *ξυνόν*. There exists therefore a shared relationship: man—*logos*—*Logos*—*theos*. The Divine sets the world in order by its *Logos*; man by his *logos* can come into contact with the Divine *Logos*.

<sup>47</sup>Cf. B45 and B115 where Heraclitus mentions the *logos* of the *psyche*.

B114 also mentions another relationship. A city bases its strength on *nomos* because "all human laws are nurtured by the one divine law." It is in its *nomoi* that a city comes into contact with the source of its laws, the one Divine *Nomos*.<sup>48</sup> The city by its laws shares in the nature of Divine in its aspect as *Nomos*. Again we have the shared relationship: city—*nomos*—*Nomos*—*theos*. Again in this relationship the *ξυνόν* is the Divine revealed as *Nomos* in which man shares by his *nomos*.

In B114 Heraclitus reveals aspects of the one divine principle whose complex nature precludes a single definition. This principle can be described in terms of the "common," whether in its aspect as *logos* that men share or as the *theios nomos* from which a city derives its laws.

In B78 Heraclitus distinguishes between the *theion ethos* and the *anthropeion ethos* in relation to the possession of *gnome*. Now B119 states that man's *ethos* reflects the activity of his *daimon*. Man can achieve *gnome*, therefore, not by virtue of his human *ethos*, but by virtue of his *daimon*. The *anthropeion ethos* is distinct from and subordinate to the *theion ethos*; the presence of the *daimon* as the determining factor of his *ethos* enables man to receive the influence of the *theion ethos* in its aspect as *gnome*. I suggest that a relationship similar to the ones found in B114 is revealed in fragments B78, B119, and B41: man—*gnome*—*Gnome*—*theos*. B78 states that the *theion ethos* has *gnomai*; in B41 man is urged to know *gnome* "by which all things are steered through all things."<sup>49</sup> Because of his *daimon* man can have *gnome*, by which he comes into contact with the divine *Gnome*, an aspect of the Divine itself. Through *τὸ ξυνόν*, *logos*, *nomos*, and *gnome* among men correspond to the related aspects of the Divine: *τὸ ξυνόν* constitutes a "force-field" between human and divine. It is permeable to the Divine, which can penetrate it to shape the affairs of men. But above a certain level it is impenetrable to men, whose aspirations draw them ever upward toward the Divine Fire through the activity of *daimon*.<sup>50</sup>

*Daimon* in B119 now takes on deeper significance. Like Parmenides and Empedocles after him, Heraclitus chose this word not only because it could denote an agent shaping man's lot but also because it signified a power inferior to *theos*.<sup>51</sup> Just as *daimon* is used by Hesiod and Theognis

<sup>48</sup>The importance that Heraclitus assigned to *nomos* is revealed also in B44 where he says that the people should fight for their *nomos* as for their city-wall.

<sup>49</sup>See above note 32. Note also that Heraclitus appears to use *γινώσκω* to signify the recognition or grasp of the true nature of things (B5, B17, B57, B97, and B108).

<sup>50</sup>We have mentioned here three instances of *τὸ ξυνόν* which refer specifically to men. Heraclitus may also have envisioned a penetration of the Divine with the rest of the existing order of things. The fragments, however, are ambiguous on this point, as for example B80: *τὸν πόλεμον ἔοντα ξυνόν*.

<sup>51</sup>Cf. Hesiod *Works and Days* 122, 126. Cf. also Plato *Republic* 468e–469a, *Cratylus* 397e–398c, and also *Symposium* 202d–e where the *daimon* is described as a being who is between "a god and a mortal man."

to denote the degree of divinity attained by man after death, so for Heraclitus it proved suitable to indicate the agency by which man became capable of gaining some apprehension of the Divine.

The relationships among *ethos*, *psyche*,<sup>52</sup> *daimon*, and *theos*<sup>53</sup> further clarify the meaning that *daimon* has in B119. Heraclitus says that the *psyche* can be dry and fiery;<sup>54</sup> in this state it is most like the *Logos* or Divine Fire.<sup>55</sup> The *psyche* can, however, change and become wet.<sup>56</sup> When the *psyche* is "driest" or "hottest" (B118), it is wisest; in this state it is most capable of apprehending the Divine, since in Heraclitus, as in Parmenides and Empedocles,<sup>57</sup> there is an identification of subject and object of knowledge. In Heraclitus a man's own *psyche* can vary in its degree of dryness just as men can differ from one another in the type of *psyche* that they possess.<sup>58</sup>

What then can be the relationship of *daimon*, *ethos*, and *psyche*? This article has suggested that B119 declares that a man's *ethos* reflects the activity of his *daimon* which varies from man to man and also changes within the individual himself. The *daimon* can be characterized as "good" or "evil"<sup>59</sup> and its nature is revealed in one's disposition. In Heraclitus' view the man with a "good" *daimon* will be a man who is wise, who has learned to speak  $\xi\upsilon\nu\ \rho\acute{o}\varphi$  (B114); the foolish man shows that his *daimon* is "bad." The fragments reveal, however, that a man's wisdom or foolishness depends on his *psyche*. There seems a close connection between *psyche* and *daimon*; *psyche* appears to be in fact the physical aspect of the *daimon*. The *psyche* varies from dry to wet as the *daimon* varies from good to bad. The *ethos*, or disposition, is determined according to the variation of the *psyche* and the *daimon*. When a man's *psyche* is driest and hottest, it is most like the divine nature; his *daimon* is good and his *ethos* therefore the closest it can come to the *theion ethos* (B78). Conversely when the *psyche* changes, a change will likewise take place in the *daimon* and the man will

<sup>52</sup>The scope of the present article does not allow a full discussion of the meaning of *psyche* in Heraclitus. A recent treatment of the question is found in M. C. Nussbaum, "ΨΤΧΗ in Heraclitus, I, II," *Phronesis* 17 (1972) 1-16, 153-170.

<sup>53</sup>Verdenius 29-30 seems to equate *theos* (*Logos*) and *daimon*. Cf. A. N. Zoumpos, "Zum Herakleitos Fragment 119," *RFIC* 93 (1965) 164, who does identify *daimon* with *theos*; B. Snell, "Die Sprache Heraklits," *Hermes* 61 (1926) 363-364; and Bollack and Wismann 328.

<sup>54</sup>B118 and B36.

<sup>55</sup>B30, B64, B66, and B90.

<sup>56</sup>B36, B77, and B117.

<sup>57</sup>See Parmenides B16 and Empedocles B109.

<sup>58</sup>See Heraclitus B107 where there is mention of *barbaroi psychai*.

<sup>59</sup>The capacity that the *daimon* possesses of becoming "good" or "evil" emerges clearly in Empedocles. He speaks of a *daimon* that is a fallen deity, one which is capable both of loving and of hating. But if it hates, it must suffer exile from the gods and only after it chooses to express love with a complete rejection of hate is it able to return to the company of the gods (B115).



have a different *ethos*. The *psyche* does not change the *daimon* nor does the *daimon* change the *psyche*. The initiative of man and the divine will are two aspects of the same thing. If a man resolves to keep his *psyche* dry,<sup>60</sup> then there may be an alteration in his *daimon* and also (necessarily) in his *ethos*; this same resolve, however, must be in part the result of a man's *daimon* working within him.

We are now able to offer an interpretation of fragment B79, the only other fragment of Heraclitus where the word *daimon* occurs:<sup>61</sup>

ἀνὴρ νῆπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.

"Man is called foolish in relation to a *daimon* just as a child is called foolish in relation to a man." The terms in this proportion are related in potentiality. The child can grow into a man; a man can come under a good *daimon* that will shape his *ethos*. B79 implies the dependence of man on the very *daimon* that in B119 is said to shape his *ethos*. B119 reveals that the *daimon* dwells within man, being his guiding spirit and the power that both enables him to apprehend the Divine and determines how far he is able to do so. Man in comparison with this *daimon* is *νήπιος*. Man's *ethos*, however, manifests the action of the *daimon* which can even enable him to achieve *gnome*. Human capabilities are extended and enlarged by the power within.

Whereas B79 indicates man's relation to his *daimon*, B83 suggests his relationship to the *theos*:

ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανέϊται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.

In relation to an ape man is a *theos*; in relation to the *theos* an ape. The examples in B83, unlike those in B79, are not related in potentiality. An ape cannot become a man, nor a man a *theos*. The examples in B83 and B79 together form an ascending scale: ape—child—man—*daimon*—*theos*. The range of potentiality is limited to the interior three, child—man—*daimon*. The ape occupies a position below that of man, the *theos* one above. Even though his *psyche* may be fiery and therefore like in composition to the *Logos*, and even though the *logos* of the *psyche* is

<sup>60</sup>Unlike, for example, the man in B117.

<sup>61</sup>The usual interpretation given to *daimon* in this fragment is that it is simply an equivalent of *theos*. See W. Zilles, "Zu einigen Fragmenten Heraklits," *RhM* 62 (1907) 54; Gomperz (above, note 2) 45; Gigon 135; Brecht (above, note 2) 129; H. Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *AJP* 59 (1938) 314–317; Verdenius 29; Jaeger 126, 233 n. 58; Kirk 399; A. Rivier, "L'Homme et l'Expérience humaine dans les Fragments d'Héraclite," *MusHelv* 13 (1956) 146; François 174; Fränkel (above, note 2) 435; Guthrie 1.415, 472; Zoumpou (above, note 53) 164; Marcovich 487; and Bollack and Wismann 241.

*bathus*,<sup>62</sup> the Divine *Logos* is at least as far above man as man is above an ape. Man is only touched by the divine fire. His potential for sharing the Divine is in the *daimon* that shapes his *ethos*. This is as close to *theos* as he can approach.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>B45. Cf. B115. Cf. also fragment B102 stressing the difference in outlook between man and god.

<sup>63</sup>We can compare references in the lyric poets that remind men that they must not try to become gods; see especially Pindar *Isth.* 5.14–16, and also Alcman 1.16 (*PMG*), Pindar *Pyth.* 10.27–28, *Ol.* 1.114, *Nem.* 3.30–31, *Ol.* 3.43–45, and *Isth.* 4.12. See also note 36 above for instances of the contrast between human and divine knowledge.